CVE-2024-0120
An out-of-bounds read vulnerability exists in the Shader Functionality functionality of NVIDIA D3D10 Driver 555.99, 32.0.15.5599. A specially crafted executable / shader file can lead to an out-of-bounds read. An attacker can provide a specially crafted shader file to trigger this vulnerability.
The versions below were either tested or verified to be vulnerable by Talos or confirmed to be vulnerable by the vendor.
NVIDIA D3D10 Driver 555.99, 32.0.15.5599
NVIDIA D3D10 Driver - https://nvidia.com
7.8 - CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
CWE-125 - Out-of-bounds Read
This vulnerability potentially could be triggered from guest machines running virtualization environments (ie. VMware, qemu, VirtualBox etc.) in order to perform guest-to-host escape - as it was demonstrated before (TALOS-2018-0533, TALOS-2018-0568, etc.). Theoretically this vulnerability could be also triggered from web browser (using webGL and webassembly). We were able to trigger this vulnerability from HYPER-V guest using RemoteFX feature leading to executing the vulnerable code on the HYPER-V host (inside of the rdvgm.exe process). While the RemoteFX was recently depracated by Microsoft some older machines may still use this software.
To trigger the bug we have modified and corrupted the shaderbyte code coresponding to the “STORE_STRUCTURED” instruction (Random-access write of 1-4 32-bit components into a structured buffer unordered access view (UAV).).
This leads to out-of-bounds memory read situation:
00007FF9EDABBF91 | 41:8B45 28 | mov eax,dword ptr ds:[r13+28] |
00007FF9EDABBF95 | 8D5F 04 | lea ebx,qword ptr ds:[rdi+4] |
00007FF9EDABBF98 | 49:8B4E 20 | mov rcx,qword ptr ds:[r14+20] |
00007FF9EDABBF9C | 44:8BC8 | mov r9d,eax |
00007FF9EDABBF9F | 894424 70 | mov dword ptr ss:[rsp+70],eax |
00007FF9EDABBFA3 | 44:8BC7 | mov r8d,edi |
00007FF9EDABBFA6 | 4C:8B91 E0020000 | mov r10,qword ptr ds:[rcx+2E0] |
00007FF9EDABBFAD | 45:0FB71C42 | movzx r11d,word ptr ds:[r10+rax*2] | *
The source memory address is computed from the shader bytecode (the RAX register contains the value taken directly from the shader bytecode). Attacker can modify the shaderbyte code in order to force the nvwgf2umx.dll to read arbitrary memory region.
First chance exceptions are reported before any exception handling.
This exception may be expected and handled.
nvwgf2umx!NVENCODEAPI_Thunk+0x2538d:
00007ff9`edabbfad 450fb71c42 movzx r11d,word ptr [r10+rax*2] ds:000002c2`2792f558=????
0:014> r
rax=00000000bbddddcc rbx=0000000000000004 rcx=000002c0afd96b60
rdx=000000cbc33bed98 rsi=00000000000000ff rdi=0000000000000000
rip=00007ff9edabbfad rsp=000000cbc33be8c0 rbp=000000cbc33be9c0
r8=0000000000000000 r9=00000000bbddddcc r10=000002c0afd739c0
r11=000000cbc33bed40 r12=000000cbc33bee98 r13=000000cbc33bed98
r14=000002c0afd95a10 r15=000000cbc33bef18
iopl=0 nv up ei pl zr na po nc
cs=0033 ss=002b ds=002b es=002b fs=0053 gs=002b efl=00010246
nvwgf2umx!NVENCODEAPI_Thunk+0x2538d:
00007ff9`edabbfad 450fb71c42 movzx r11d,word ptr [r10+rax*2] ds:000002c2`2792f558=????
0:014> !analyze -v
*******************************************************************************
* *
* Exception Analysis *
* *
*******************************************************************************
KEY_VALUES_STRING: 1
Key : AV.Fault
Value: Read
Key : Analysis.CPU.mSec
Value: 890
Key : Analysis.Elapsed.mSec
Value: 1320
Key : Analysis.IO.Other.Mb
Value: 0
Key : Analysis.IO.Read.Mb
Value: 0
Key : Analysis.IO.Write.Mb
Value: 0
Key : Analysis.Init.CPU.mSec
Value: 499
Key : Analysis.Init.Elapsed.mSec
Value: 33201
Key : Analysis.Memory.CommitPeak.Mb
Value: 92
Key : Failure.Bucket
Value: INVALID_POINTER_READ_c0000005_nvwgf2umx.dll!Unknown
Key : Failure.Hash
Value: {7b367f86-064a-2e05-5dc0-760739d560ad}
Key : Timeline.OS.Boot.DeltaSec
Value: 605523
Key : Timeline.Process.Start.DeltaSec
Value: 33
Key : WER.OS.Branch
Value: vb_release
Key : WER.OS.Version
Value: 10.0.19041.1
NTGLOBALFLAG: 70
APPLICATION_VERIFIER_FLAGS: 0
EXCEPTION_RECORD: (.exr -1)
ExceptionAddress: 00007ff9edabbfad (nvwgf2umx!NVENCODEAPI_Thunk+0x000000000002538d)
ExceptionCode: c0000005 (Access violation)
ExceptionFlags: 00000000
NumberParameters: 2
Parameter[0]: 0000000000000000
Parameter[1]: 000002c22792f558
Attempt to read from address 000002c22792f558
FAULTING_THREAD: 00006124
PROCESS_NAME: POC_EXEC11.exe
READ_ADDRESS: 000002c22792f558
ERROR_CODE: (NTSTATUS) 0xc0000005 - Instrukcja w 0x%p odwo a a si do pami ci pod adresem 0x%p. Pami nie mo e by %s.
EXCEPTION_CODE_STR: c0000005
EXCEPTION_PARAMETER1: 0000000000000000
EXCEPTION_PARAMETER2: 000002c22792f558
STACK_TEXT:
000000cb`c33be8c0 00007ff9`edca59af : 00000000`00000000 000000cb`c33bed98 00000000`00000000 00007bf2`020c6a45 : nvwgf2umx!NVENCODEAPI_Thunk+0x2538d
000000cb`c33bed20 00007ff9`eda9e1cd : 00007ff9`edae3a94 000000cb`c33bef30 000002c0`afd95a10 00000000`00000001 : nvwgf2umx!NVAPI_Thunk+0x1a5fef
000000cb`c33bed60 00007ff9`eda9d063 : 00000000`ea2878a0 000000cb`c33bf2a0 00000000`ea2878a7 00000000`ea287877 : nvwgf2umx!NVENCODEAPI_Thunk+0x75ad
000000cb`c33bf220 00007ff9`ed9984fa : 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000018 000000cb`c33bf6c0 : nvwgf2umx!NVENCODEAPI_Thunk+0x6443
000000cb`c33bf2d0 00007ff9`ed999b55 : 000002c0`afd72470 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 : nvwgf2umx!NVAPI_DirectMethods+0x288ea
000000cb`c33bf3b0 00007ff9`ee1dc58a : 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 : nvwgf2umx!NVAPI_DirectMethods+0x29f45
000000cb`c33bf690 00007ff9`ee1dc2a8 : 00000000`00000000 000002c0`ade20440 00000000`00000000 000002c0`afe6d458 : nvwgf2umx!NVDEV_Thunk+0x8b17a
000000cb`c33bf7a0 00007ff9`ee150f73 : 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 000002c0`afd722d0 00000000`00000000 : nvwgf2umx!NVDEV_Thunk+0x8ae98
000000cb`c33bf850 00007ff9`ee150e6f : 00000000`00000000 000002c0`afd4ac60 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 : nvwgf2umx!OpenAdapter12+0x1210e3
000000cb`c33bf8a0 00007ff9`ee7be1fe : 000002c0`afd4ac60 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 : nvwgf2umx!OpenAdapter12+0x120fdf
000000cb`c33bf8d0 00007ffa`e9637344 : 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 : nvwgf2umx!SetDependencyInfo+0x43ad5e
000000cb`c33bf900 00007ffa`ea2c26b1 : 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 : KERNEL32!BaseThreadInitThunk+0x14
000000cb`c33bf930 00000000`00000000 : 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 : ntdll!RtlUserThreadStart+0x21
SYMBOL_NAME: nvwgf2umx+2538d
MODULE_NAME: nvwgf2umx
IMAGE_NAME: nvwgf2umx.dll
STACK_COMMAND: ~14s ; .cxr ; kb
FAILURE_BUCKET_ID: INVALID_POINTER_READ_c0000005_nvwgf2umx.dll!Unknown
BUCKET_ID_MODPRIVATE: 1
OS_VERSION: 10.0.19041.1
BUILDLAB_STR: vb_release
OSPLATFORM_TYPE: x64
OSNAME: Windows 10
IMAGE_VERSION: 32.0.15.5599
FAILURE_ID_HASH: {7b367f86-064a-2e05-5dc0-760739d560ad}
Followup: MachineOwner
---------
2024-07-04 - Vendor Disclosure
2024-10-22 - Vendor Patch Release
2024-10-23 - Public Release
Discovered by Piotr Bania of Cisco Talos.